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The protracted armed conflict in Somalia has engendered an unprecedented humanitarian crisis; one 
that makes it a leading storehouse of the worst humanitarian conditions in the world. The intervention of 
the African Union (AU) through its third Peace Support Operation— the African Union Mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM)— was aimed at supporting the Transitional Federal Institutions in the stabilisation of 
the country, advancing dialogue and reconciliation as well as facilitating the provision of humanitarian 
support. The achievement of the humanitarian component of the mission’s mandate is largely contingent 
on the first two mandates. Essentially, this study interrogated the interface between the implementation 
of the humanitarian component of AMISOM mandate and the control of the worsening conditions of 
Somali internally displaced persons and refugees. Anchoring analysis within the classical approach to 
national security, the study found that the restoration of relative stability in the polity has not widened 
access to economic and humanitarian assistance in the terror-laden state of Somalia. Thus, greater 
commitment of major stakeholders, especially the United Nations (UN), the United States as well as the 
AU is required in the transmutation of AMISOM and Somalia National Armed Forces into a force that is 
entirely indigenous to the people of Somalia. This will serve as an elixir to the ever-constricting 
humanitarian corridor that has exacerbated the conditions of the victims of forced migration in Somalia. 
 






Since the founding of the Fund for Peace in 2005, it has continued to accord the Federal Republic 
of Somalia an unenviable position in the Fragile States Index (formerly called Failed States Index). 
This is largely because of the non-existence of an effective central government that could 
guarantee the integrity of the country for almost three decades now. The absence of an effective 
government since 1991 has culminated in violent armed struggle, dearth of public services, 
widespread corruption and proliferation of victims of forced or involuntary migration in the country. 
Invariably, the history of state failure in Somalia is traceable to the internecine armed conflict which 
became full-blown after the collapse of the dictatorial regime of Major General Siad Barre on 27 
January 1991. After 26 years of unbroken civil war, the prospect of attaining political stability is still 
far-fetched. Fighting between the various clan-based factions and al-Shabaab insurgents on the 
one hand and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)-supported Somalia National Armed 
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Forces (SNAF) on the other hand has spanned several years. The unequalled humanitarian 
disaster arising from this conflict has worsened the conditions of Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) in Somalia. The prevailing humanitarian situation is traceable to at least three interrelated 
20th century phenomena: colonialism, Cold War and the dictatorial regime of General Barre. 
The combination of these forces in the post-colonial Somalia heralded the clan-based crisis of 
the 1980s and the political turmoil that had crystallised since 1991. For instance, Andre & Majid 
(2002), Egbo (2001), Francis (2006), Møller (2009), Dagne (2011), Margesson et al. (2012), 
Nwangwu (2014), Maxwell et al. (2014), Wondemagegnehu & Kebede (2017), among others, have 
highlighted the dynamic interplay of the disparate (if not contradictory) Italian and British colonial 
policies in Somalia, General Barre’s alliance with the Soviet Union during the heyday of Cold War 
as well as General Barre’s dictatorial disposition, in the origin and exacerbation of the Somali 
conflict. The political romance between Somalia and the Soviet Union under the Cold War regime 
culminated in the implementation of some socialist ideals like scientific socialism. The doctrine of 
scientific socialism was an admixture of Marxism and Quranic interpretations. Similarly, in line with 
his ideology of Pan-Somalism, General Barre formed the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) 
through which he proclaimed the end of tribalism, nepotism, corruption and misrule. Pan-Somalism 
advocated the unification of all ethnic Somalis under one flag and one nation. It was the basis upon 
which the Ethio-Somali War (otherwise called the Ogaden War) of July 1977 to March 1978 was 
prosecuted. Prior to the war, SRC aligned itself with the Soviet Union and denounced the US–
African policies as imperialist. Through the existence of strong diplomatic intercourse between 
Somalia under General Barre and the defunct Soviet Union, the former attained phenomenal 
economic development until mid-1970s when the latter withdrew its support. 
Despite the rhetoric about Pan-Somalism, General Barre consistently pursued clannish 
policies which totally negated the ideology. His defeat in the 1977-78 expansionist war by the 
Soviet Union- and Cuba-backed new Marxist government in Ethiopia generated severe 
humanitarian and refugee crises. Thus, Alexander as cited in Moller (2009:7) affirms that “by 1983, 
as many as 1.3 million refugees had arrived in Somalia causing severe strain on the economy 
particularly in the Isaaq-dominated northern area”. Consequent upon the widespread political, 
economic and humanitarian crises that accompanied General Barre’s dictatorial regime, several 
attempts were made to unseat him especially by the military officers from Majeerteen clan and the 
Isaaq-dominated Somali National Movement (SNM). Throughout the early 1980s, the SNM 
prosecuted a low intensity guerrilla war against the government. Similarly, in 1989 a group of 
Somali exiles from the Hawiye clan formed the United Somali Congress (USC) in Rome. The USC 
militia successfully drove General Barre out of Mogadishu on January 27, 1991 in spite of the 
repressive tendencies of his special force— the Red Berets. 
Somalia degenerated into anarchy as rival ethnic warlords battled for supremacy and the 
control of state power. The conflagration spread across the country, sparking an ill-fated 
international humanitarian intervention. For almost 30 years now, Somalia has remained a lawless 
zone with no effective government. This situation is largely treated as the cause as well as effect of 
the escalating militancy and terrorism perpetrated by various Islamist, extremist and militant groups, 
especially al-Shabaab. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
2012 report, in the first half of 2011 alone, more than 83,000 Somalis fled into Kenya and over 
54,000 into Ethiopia. In July, daily arrivals in each country ranged from 1,300 to 1,700. An 
additional 2,600 Somalis had crossed the north-western border into Djibouti by mid-2011. The 
situation has remained critical and deteriorating. Although famine conditions are no longer prevalent 
in the country, approximately two million Somalis are still considered food insecure (UNHCR, 2012). 
In corroboration, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) noted that the 
humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate and the possibility of famine in 2017 persists 
(OCHA, 2017). In addition, there are one million internally displaced persons in Somalia and 
another one million Somali refugees in neighbouring countries (Ging, 2013). Similar report from the 
former Chairperson of the African Union Commission— Nkosazana Clarice Dlamini-Zuma— 
indicates that there are over one million Somali refugees in the region. These refugees are found 
predominantly in Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen. The 
report also puts the number of IDPs at one million who are living in excruciating conditions in camps 
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across the country (Dlamini-Zuma, 2013). 
AMISOM is a regional peacekeeping mission established in early 2007 and mandated inter 
alia, to facilitate humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees 
and the resettlement of IDPs. The mission also supports the Somali forces in their counter-terror 
operations of al-Shabaab. Although the security situation has reasonably improved since the 
creation of the Federal Government of Somalia (the successor to the internationally recognised but 
domestically unpopular Transitional Federal Government) on August 20, 2012, there are a number 
of incidents which continue to restrict and undermine access to and delivery of humanitarian 
assistance to the needy population. For instance, humanitarian needs in South-Central Somalia 
have remained high as a result of worsening security situation engendered by road blockade since 
the area came under the control of the fragile Federal Government of Somalia. The near absence 
of public infrastructure, including health, education and other social services, accounts for the 
deteriorating conditions of the war‐weary population, especially the vulnerable groups like women, 
children and persons living with disability. Consequently, this study investigates the role of the 




This study is a qualitative research. It relied basically on the documentary method for the 
generation of data. The documentary method is concerned with the analysis of documents that 
contain information about a given phenomenon under investigation. Simply put, a document is a 
written text. According to Payne and Payne (as cited in Mogalakwe, 2006: 221), “documentary 
method is the technique used to categorize, investigate, interpret and identify the limitations of 
physical sources, most commonly written documents whether in the private or public domain”. The 
documentary research method is also often considered a monopoly of professional historians, 
librarians and information science specialists. Thus, it has had little attention in social and 
behavioural sciences compared to other methods such as statistics and quantification which are 
popular forms of data collection and analysis. The method, therefore, is largely under-utilised and 
often considered a subsidiary research method in the social sciences. However, it is not less 
rigorous and scientific because of its adherence to the tenets of scientific protocol. 
Sources of documentary research include historical documents such as laws, declarations, 
statutes, and people’s accounts of events and periods. They also include reports based on official 
statistics, as well as governmental records, mass media, literary texts, drawings and personal 
documents such as dairies and biographies. The methodological significance of this tool cannot be 
over-emphasised. It was useful in identifying information gaps that needed to be filled, formulating 
the research problem, developing a theoretical framework and articulating the research 
methodology. This data gathering technique enables access into the inner recesses of group life, 
organisational structure, bureaucratic processes as well as the motivations for individual behaviour. 
In relation to the study, data were gathered from official sources such as the African Union Peace 
and Security Council, African Union Commission, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, UN Security Council, UN High Commissioner on Refugees, and so on. The study also 
included data from journal publications and conference papers, among others. 
The mass of data generated were analysed using the qualitative descriptive method of data 
analysis. This method moves farther into the domain of interpretation because effort is made to 
understand not only the manifest but also the latent content of data with a view to discovering 
patterns or regularities in them. Tables were used for further illumination of the issues in the 
discourse. The study also utilised the classical theory of national security through which deeper 
theoretical insights were elicited as shall be seen below. Consequently, the study was able to 
establish the interface between the counter-insurgency operations of AMISOM-SNAF and the 
humanitarian crisis in Somalia. 
 
 Theorising the Involvement of AMISOM-SNAF in the Somali Conflict 3.
 
The establishment of AMISOM in January 2007 as the third Peace Support Operations (PSOs) of 
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the African Union (AU) as well as the implementation of the Mission’s mandate has generated a 
flurry of theoretical justifications. The principal school of thought on the role definition for AMISOM 
in the containment of the rampaging al-Shabaab militancy and the consequent amelioration of the 
humanitarian crisis in Somalia is contingent on the security-oriented approach. This approach 
favours the enhancement of security system and the continuing defeat of insurgents. Thus, the 
study and understanding of the interface between the implementation of the humanitarian 
component of AMISOM’s mandate and the worsening conditions of IDPs and refugees of Somali 
extraction in the terror-ridden state of Somalia is guided by the security-oriented approach. 
The security-oriented approach otherwise known as the classical theory of national security 
has remained the most dominant perspective within the extant literature.  This orthodox 
conceptualisation of national security is associated with state-centrism and militarism. The central 
thrust of the perspective is that national defence, security and protection of a country from attack or 
subversion is the ultimate raison d’être of the state. Preparation for military action, intelligence 
gathering and espionage, among others, are included in national defence and security strategies of 
a country. 
The state-centric scholarship which has dominated the international system evolved as a 
product of the Westphalia state system in 1648. Thus, it conceptualises national security purely as 
a politico-military phenomenon. It is used to refer to the capacity of a ruling group to use state 
power to protect its interest or values from external threats as well as maintain order internally 
(Nwangwu & Ononogbu, 2014; Nwangwu et al., 2016). Everything the state or its agencies do is 
justified in the name of national security. This has been possible because much of the leadership in 
Africa and the rest of the world have rigidly adhered to the concept of national security devised 
during the seventeenth century in accordance with realities of the time. However, the unbridled use 
of instruments of coercion otherwise called ‘hard security’ which is associated with this perspective 
has been carpeted by Mbah (2008:156) when he argued that “the greater application of hard 
security is an indication that the ruling groups are in fact insecure, notwithstanding the appearance 
of strength represented by coercive instruments of the state”. 
Although security demands military power sufficient to dissuade or defeat an attack, there are 
so many non-military elements that are required to generate effective military power that a concern 
for security can never be restricted solely to the final military end product. Hence, there is general 
acceptance that national security must go beyond the narrow focus on external attack and the use 
of the military to defeat it (Nwangwu & Ononogbu, 2014). Accordingly, Nnoli (2006:17) avers that: 
although a concern for security must ultimately focus on the physical danger to a state that is 
posed by imbalances in military power, a concern for security cannot be limited simply to military 
power. A state fashions the military power it deploys from various elements: the economic wealth of 
the nation, the quality of its political leadership, the cohesiveness of the polity, the motivation of its 
citizenry, the nature of its military leadership, its access to food and raw materials, and so on. 
This unrestrained use of coercion to preserve a state of affair usually favourable to the 
governing elite is implicated in the emergence and escalation of al-Shabaab terrorism and the 
attendant deteriorating humanitarian conditions of Somali IDPs and refugees. The implementation 
of AMISOM mandate has been strengthened over the years through a progressive increase in the 
force strength of the Mission. For instance, the force strength of AMISOM which were two battalions 
each provided and deployed by Uganda and Burundi in 2007 and 2008 respectively has been 
expanded to a maximum of 22,126 uniformed personnel, comprising 21,586 soldiers and 540 police 
officers. The progressive increase in the force strength has been made possible through United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1964 (2010), 2036 (2012) and 2124 (2013). While 
the progressive numerical expansion of AMISOM-SNAF strength and its attendant daring 
offensives have significantly contained al-Shabaab insurgency in major cities of Somalia, this has 
not translated into wider access to humanitarian assistance by IDPs and refugees of Somali 
extraction. This is paradoxical. 
The resultant effect of this state of affair is the unprecedented and ever-constricting 
humanitarian corridor in Somalia which has exacerbated the conditions of the IDPs. Although 
increasing food insecurity in Somalia can be partly attributed to natural causes such as drought, the 
principal causative factor remains the escalation of armed conflict between the AMISOM-backed 
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SNAF and al-Shabaab insurgents. The UNHCR reports that 73,000 people have been internally 
displaced since the military offensive launched in March 2014. This has negatively impacted on 
food production as farmers are forced away from their fields. Perhaps most significantly, al-
Shabaab insurgents often imposed embargoes on shipments of humanitarian aid by road into much 
of the territory captured during its offensive (Nwangwu, 2014). This has further exacerbated food 
insecurity in Somalia. 
 
 Deployment of AMISOM Force and the Counter-Insurgency Operations in Somalia 4.
 
The legal foundation stone for the justification of regional peacekeeping operations is situated 
under the ambit of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Acting specifically under Articles 52 and 53 of 
the Charter, the Declaration on the Enhancement of Cooperation between the UN and Regional 
Arrangement in the Maintenance of International Peace of 9 December 1994 as well as the 
Communiqué of the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU-PSC) of 19 January 2007, the 
UNSC on 20 February 2007 passed Resolution 1744 which reiterated its support for the 
Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs). The Resolution also authorised the creation of AMISOM; 
thereby endorsing the previous AU decision to found a PSO in Somalia. It calls for a national 
reconciliation congress of major stakeholders, especially political, clan-based and religious leaders 
as well as members of civil society organisations. Thus, AMISOM was formed by the AU-PSC as a 
regional PSO with the mandate to address the protracted problems of militancy and terrorism, 
support the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in their effort of stabilising the country as well as 
widen access to the inflow of humanitarian assistance to the terror-ravaged country. The Mission’s 
mandate is contained in paragraph (4) (a) to (e) of Resolution 1744 of the UNSC as well as the 
Communiqué of the AU-PSC 69th Meeting of 19 January 2007. 
The poorly-implemented Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace 
Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM) was outmoded and supplanted by AMISOM. IGASOM was 
a training mission approved by the AU-PSC as well as UNSC in September 2006. The AU-PSC, 
therefore, deployed AMISOM for an initial but renewable period of six months with the ultimate aim 
of contributing to the initial stabilisation phase in Somalia. The Mission was also intended to 
eventually crystallise into a UN mission that would support a long-term stabilisation and post-
conflict peace building in Somalia. 
Initially, the UNSC authorised the AU-PSC to deploy 8,000 AMISOM troops in Somalia. The 
Mission’s mandate was renewed by the UNSC on 22 December 2010 through Resolution 1964. 
Correspondingly, the Resolution increased the UN logistical support from 8,000 to 12,000 AMISOM 
troops. On 30 September 2011, UNSC through Resolution 2010 renewed AMISOM’s mandate until 
31 October 2012 and expanded the scope of logistics support provided by United Nations Support 
Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) to include catering, communications, cleaning, furniture and welfare. 
On 22 February 2012, the UNSC through Resolution 2036 expanded and extended AMISOM’s 
footprint out of Mogadishu into four established sectors of Somalia. It also boosted AMISOM’s force 
strength from 12,000 to a maximum of 17,731 uniformed personnel, comprised mainly of troops and 
personnel of Formed Police Units (FPU). On 21 November 2012, UNSC Resolution 2077 extended 
the mandate of AMISOM and UNSOA until 7 March 2013, in order to give the UN and the AU time 
to conduct strategic reviews. Furthermore, the UNSC through Resolution 2124 expanded the 
logistical support package for AMISOM by increasing its force strength from 17,731 to a maximum 
of 22,126 uniformed personnel, comprising 21,586 soldiers and 540 police officers, until 31 October 
2014. However, the most recent decision of the UN on Somalia is contained in the UNSC 
Resolution 2355 of 26 May, 2017. Among others, the Council extends AMISOM’s authorisation until 
31 August 2017 with a maximum strength of 22,126 uniformed personnel. Table 1 shows some 
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Authorising the establishment of AMISOM within six months, with the mandate of 





Renewal and extension of AMISOM’s mandate by six months. It also resolved to take 
action against parties threatening AMISOM, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 





Renewal and extension of AMISOM’s mandate by six months. It also authorised the 











Calling upon states to prevent individuals threatening Somalia’s TFG and AMISOM from 
entering into or transiting their territories. 
6 Resolution 
1863 










Extension of AMISOM’s deployment to 30 September 2011. It also recommended that 





Imposition of tough sanctions against parties threatening the security of Somalia, 
obstructing the inflow of humanitarian assistance, and those violating an arms embargo 










Widening of AMISOM’s operational scope to four sectors as set out in the Strategic 
Concept of 5 January 2012. It also boosted AMISOM’s force strength from 12,000 to a 






Renewal of AMISOM for four months and expansion of the UN logistical support package 





Called on the Secretary-General to continue to provide a logistical support package for 
AMISOM, for a maximum of 17,731 uniformed personnel until 28 February 2014 and to 
ensure the accountability and transparency of expenditure of the UN funds as set out in 
paragraph 4 of Resolution 1910. 
14 Resolution 
2102 





Extension of AMISOM’s mandate and increase of its force strength from 17,731 to a 










Extension of AMISOM’s mandate until 30 October 2015. The Council reiterated that the 
arms embargo on Somalia shall not apply to deliveries of weapons, ammunition or 
military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training, intended solely for 
















UNSOA changes to UNSOS and is responsible for support to AMISOM, UNSOM and the 





Authorising a short technical rollover of AMISOM until 8 July 2016. This is aimed at 
allowing Council members time to assess the results of their 17-22 May Somalia-focused 














Extension of AMISOM’s authorisation until 31 August 2017 with a maximum strength of 
22,126 uniformed personnel. 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors mainly from Security Council Report. Available from: 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/somalia/. 
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AMISOM has basically three components. These are Military, Police and Civilian who work hand in 
hand to achieve the Mission’s mandate. AMISOM staff is drawn from a wide range of countries 
within Africa. The headquarters of the military component is staffed by officers from Burundi, 
Cameroon, Djibouti, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Uganda and Zambia. However, many of its troops are drawn from six countries viz: Burundi, 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Uganda. As noted above, the strength of AMISOM 
uniformed personnel stands at 22,126. Along with the current force headquarters staff of 81, the 
military component has 5,432 troops from Burundi, 1,000 from Djibouti, 3,664 from Kenya, 850 from 
Sierra Leone, 4,395 from Ethiopia and 6,223 from Uganda (www.amisom-au.org). On the other 
hand, the police component is made up of Professionals or Senior Leadership Team (SLT), FPU 
and Individual Police Officers (IPOs). The IPOs are drawn from Burundi, The Gambia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zimbabwe while the FPUs from Nigeria and Uganda 
each comprise of 140 officers. The IPOs are deployed in all the AMISOM sectors. It currently has 
515 police officers and is comprised of 230 IPOs from Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda; 
280 FPUs from Nigeria and Uganda, and 5 SLT officers from Burundi, The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria 
and Uganda, (www.amisom-au.org). Lastly, the Mission’s civilian component is limited to assisting 
the Federal Government of Somalia in re-establishing functioning state institutions and delivery of 
humanitarian services to the people of Somalia. Originally based in Nairobi, the component was 
relocated to Mogadishu in May 2011. The civilian component is made up of six units which includes 
Political, Humanitarian, Gender, Civil Affairs, Security and Safety, Public Information and 
Administration Units. 
By and large, the AMISOM military component has been instrumental in helping SNAF push 
al-Shabaab out of much of southern Somalia, including major towns and cities. It has created a 
relatively secure environment which has ensured the commencement of the Somali peace process, 
allowed local population the opportunity to re-create accountable governance institutions that are 
poised to deliver essential services, rebuild the local economy and create linkages to the national 
economy and government. 
 
Table 2: Showing AMISOM Troop & Police Contributing Countries 
 
S/N Country Armed Personnel Casualties 
  Troops Police Killed Missing/captured 
1 Uganda People's Defence Force 6, 223 201 83  
2 Burundi National Defence Force 5, 432  417 4 missing; 1 captured 
3 Ethiopian National Defence Force 4, 395  2  
4 Kenya Defence Forces 3, 664 48 154  
5 Djibouti Armed Forces 1, 000  8  
6 Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces 850 47   
7 Nigeria Police Force  200   
8 Ghana Police Service  56   
 Total 21, 564 552 664 5 
 
Source: Nwangwu, C. (2014). “The Counter-Terrorism Operations of AMISOM-SNAF and Control 
of Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia”, Journal of International Relations and Diplomacy (JIRAD) 1 
(1&2), 222-241. 
 
Prior to the passage of the UNSC Resolutions 2036 and 2124 of 2012 and 2013 respectively, which 
among other things, expanded the logistical support package for AMISOM by increasing its force 
strength from 12,000 to 17,731 and from 17,731 to a maximum of 22,126 uniformed personnel, 
AMISOM comprised merely two battalions of 1,600 troops each from Uganda and Burundi. Nigeria 
and Ghana which had earlier pledged 850 and 350 troops respectively could not deploy because of 
paucity of logistical and financial resources. In the same vein, expected troop deployment by Sierra 
Leone was delayed as a result of logistical supply problems involving the acquisition of ammunition. 
Thus, sourcing and deploying its personnel undermined the implementation of the Mission’s 
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mandate. Some of the TCCs which pledged to deploy troops lacked the logistical, institutional and 
financial capabilities to do so. Furthermore, AMISOM still lacks the numbers to control its different 
areas of operations. According to Seguí (2013:9), “a force of 35,000 is required to fully undertake 
the responsibilities of this multidimensional peace support mission”. However, the AU has been 
unable to convince Member States to deploy such numbers of troops for a variety of reasons that 
include limited available forces and budgets as well as other emerging threats or internal armed 
conflicts within the territories of the TCCs that need to be addressed. For instance, the Boko Haram 
insurgency which started as a domestic terrorist organisation in Nigeria later expanded and became 
a regional contagion, especially within the Lake Chad Basin. This has affected the Nigerian 
government and other members of the Multinational Joint Task Force from fulfilling their troop 
contributions and budgetary obligations to the AMISOM. Needless to say, it has heightened the 
likelihood of a possible reduction of funds allocated to the Mission. For instance, France has 
already announced its interest in reallocating financial resources from AMISOM to a probable AU-
led military intervention in Mali. More fundamentally, the core troop contributing countries— 
Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda — have publicly floated the idea of bringing their 
forces home (Maruf, 2017). 
Other challenges bedevilling the Mission include complaints by AMISOM soldiers concerning 
their salaries and working conditions. According to Nwangwu (2014), the AU, in accordance with 
agreements signed with the TCCs, reimburses every AMISOM soldiers at a rate of US$600 per 
month; a pittance when compared to the hazardous working conditions they are exposed to. 
AMISOM has also faced a number of challenges related to the coordination of troops. The intricacy 
of the integration of different national troops, which entails the harmonisation of a variety of different 
institutional cultures, capacities and methods, has been complicated and time-consuming. Tensions 
related to strategies and priorities among different troop contingents are quite common and remain 
unresolved. For instance, the Burundi-AMISOM contingent was resentful that the Kenyans were 
second in command of the mission when Burundians had participated longer and made more 
sacrifices. Similarly, the training of troops, particularly after the expansion of AMISOM operations, is 
still a significant challenge. More fundamentally, the AMISOM troops are still being perceived by the 
local population largely as ‘occupying’ troops. 
Despite these challenges, the progressive increase of AMISOM force strength, among other 
strategies, has reasonably led to the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia. Al-Shabaab has 
been effectively evicted from major urban centres in southern Somalia, including Mogadishu, 
Baidoa, the port cities of Marka and Kismayo, as well as many other towns like Afgooye, Afmadow, 
Bay, Bakool and Hiran (Seguí, 2013). Consequently, Somalia is now facing a post-transitional 
phase characterised by the launching of a new constitution, inauguration of a new Federal 
Parliament and the swearing-in of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President of Somalia in August 
2012. The government has been further consolidated following the successful presidential election 
of 8 February 2017 which led to the emergence of the former Prime Minister, Mohamed Abdullahi 
Mohamed, as the President. Nonetheless, these landmark achievements in the counter-terror 
campaign of the Mission have not been translated into a favourable environment for the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance to the needy population in Mogadishu and its environs. Instead, the 
counter-insurgency operations have remained central to the exacerbation of the humanitarian 
condition in Somalia as shall be demonstrated below. 
 
 Counter-Terror Campaign of AMISOM and Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance  5.
 
A humanitarian crisis refers to an event or series of events which constitutes a critical threat to the 
health, safety, security or wellbeing of a community or other large group of people, usually over a 
wide area. It is caused by either natural or man-made disasters. Examples of natural disasters 
commonly associated with humanitarian crisis are drought, desert encroachment, flooding, storms, 
earthquakes, wild fire and volcanic eruptions. On the other hand, common anthropogenic factors 
that precipitate humanitarian crisis are armed conflicts, train crashes, air crashes, fires and 
industrial accidents. The humanitarian crisis in Somalia has been sustained through the 
combination of armed conflict and drought. The humanitarian mandate of AMISOM is contained in 
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paragraph (4) (d) of the UNSC Resolution 1744 of 2007. The provision states that AMISOM shall 
contribute, as may be requested and within capabilities, to the creation of necessary security 
conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance. The mandate further provides that AMISOM 
shall facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the 
repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of IDPs. This is an implicit 
acknowledgement of the fact that the Mission lacks both the requisite material and human capacity 
to carry out full humanitarian mandate. 
In the implementation of its narrow humanitarian mandate, AMISOM has continued to facilitate 
the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. Since its deployment in 2007, the Mission has 
effectively secured all the necessary humanitarian corridors especially airport, seaport and major 
streets of Mogadishu. The Mission also provides essential escorts to humanitarian convoys headed 
for distribution points in and around Mogadishu. It continues to coordinate its activities and to 
cooperate with UN humanitarian organisations and other bodies working in Somalia to ensure 
greater access to humanitarian aid. This has enabled humanitarian workers to address the needs of 
the Somali population in the areas under the control of the Somali government. In terms of 
cooperation with humanitarian agencies, the AMISOM Humanitarian Liaison Unit works closely with 
OCHA-Somalia, UNICEF-Somalia, UNHCR-Somalia, World Food Programme and other UN bodies 
and non-governmental entities in order to establish effective coordination mechanisms and 
information sharing. The Mission also works in partnership with the Somali Ministry of Humanitarian 
Affairs and Resettlement, Ministry of Health, among other relevant authorities. Thus, the Mission 
has facilitated the voluntary return and resettlement of some refugees and IDPs. 
Moreover, the Mission has continued, unswervingly, to provide life-saving support to the 
needy population, particularly in places where aid workers are non-existent or have limited access. 
This support includes potable water, healthcare and other basic amenities. Although the health 
facilities were designed to provide medical services for the deployed troops, AMISOM field 
hospitals and medical officials have been providing services to the civilian population. In view of the 
magnitude of the problems in Somalia, AMISOM medical facilities have become the foremost 
medical centre for the civilian population in Mogadishu and its environs. The field hospitals treat an 
average of 12,000 patients per month. Treatments vary from chronic medical diseases to surgical 
cases, both acute and chronic. Over 90% of these patients are from the local population, including 
officials and troops of the TFG (now Federal Government of Somalia), most of them requiring 
emergency surgical interventions (Kromah, 2010). During the flooding of 2012 in Jowhar, AMISOM 
donated medicines to the Governor of Middle Shabelle for distribution to victims of the disaster. 
Also within the period, the Mission worked hand in hand with the Mayor of Mogadishu to reconstruct 
four water wells in Dharkenley, Hamar Jabjab, Hamar Weyne, Wadajir Districts of Mogadishu 
(Dlamini-Zuma, 2013). 
Nonetheless, AMISOM has been accused of not abiding by international humanitarian laws. 
Most of its military operations have led to civilian deaths through its heavy-handed response to al-
Shabaab attacks. Initially, the AMISOM operational mandate did not include specific human rights 
components, in line with international standards for peacekeeping. According to Seguí (2013:7), 
“the international community prioritized strengthening the fledgling TFG and reducing al-Shabaab 
capacities and control, leading to a situation where the protection of the Somali civilian population 
was neglected”. For instance, four months after AMISOM’s deployment, one-third of Mogadishu’s 
population abandoned the city because of the brutal violence and destruction caused by 
confrontations between the Mission and al-Shabaab forces. Thus, al-Shabaab offensives and the 
counter-insurgency operations of AMISOM-SNAF have severely exacerbated the humanitarian 
situation in Somalia. Large-scale displacement due to conflict has in the past created complex 
emergencies characterised by increased humanitarian needs. As a result of the ever-surging size of 
refugees and IDPs in the country, the Mission is widely regarded as an ‘occupying’ force instead of 
a peacekeeping one. This perception has denied the Mission the much-needed domestic 
cooperation and support. Thus, it should be squarely addressed if the Mission is to be viewed as 
legitimate and credible by the Somali population. 
The military campaign by the AMISOM-SNAF to recover al-Shabaab controlled areas in 
southern and central Somalia continues to bloat the size of IDPs in Bakool and Lower Shabelle 
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regions. The UNHCR report as cited in the October 2014 OCHA Somalia Humanitarian Bulletin 
shows that more than 7,000 people fled their homes in August and September due to the 
campaign. The Bulletin further notes that over 80,000 people have been uprooted from their homes 
since the initial launch of the military operation in March 2014, with more than 73,000 during the 
first phase. The humanitarian condition has been further exacerbated by the threat posed by 
drought in the country. Overall, May 2017 OCHA Somalia Humanitarian Bulletin reports that the 
number of people in need of humanitarian assistance has increased from 6.2 million to 6.7 million 
people, while approximately 2,510,000 people will be in crisis and 700,000 in emergency levels of 
food insecurity in June 2017. The prolonged drought has also led to lack of water and the largest 
outbreak of cholera in Somalia within the last five years with nearly 42,721 cases and almost 715 
deaths as of 27 May 2017. By the same token, the report from the former Chairperson of the 
African Union Commission indicates that over 1 million Somali refugees are hosted mainly in 
Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen (Dlamini-Zuma, 2013). 
It is also important to note that contrary to the prevailing trite argument that effective 
prosecution of the AMISOM-SNAF counter-terror operations would lead to an opportunity for aid 
organisations to have greater access to people in need of humanitarian assistance, the successes 
recorded by the combined campaign of AMISOM-SNAF against al-Shabaab are yet to be translated 
into predictable humanitarian access. In other words, the relative stabilisation of national security 
since 2011, the retreat of al-Shabaab insurgents from Mogadishu and its environs, and the 
emergence of new permanent and democracy-oriented government institutions have not squarely 
addressed the fragile food security and humanitarian situation in the country. 
Although the security situation has undoubtedly improved, several security incidents continue 
to restrict access to humanitarian services and even undermine the delivery of relief materials to the 
needy population. For instance, humanitarian needs in South-Central Somalia— a priority for 
UNHCR operations— have remained high as a result of worsening security situation and road 
blockade since the area came under the control of the fragile Federal Government of Somalia. 
Road access is highly inhibited in 28 districts in Southern and Central Somalia because of 
insecurity along major supply routes, road blockages and encirclement of newly recovered areas by 
armed non-state actors. Illegal check-points, banditry and demands for bribes are experienced 
even in areas where there has been no active conflict. In the first nine months of 2014, 2,200 
conflict incidents with humanitarian implications were registered, of which 107 incidents were 
related to checkpoints (OCHA, 2014). 
Furthermore, AMISOM-SNAF military campaign against al-Shabaab in key food producing 
areas of Somalia, such as Lower and Middle Shabelle and Lower and Middle Juba, has aggravated 
the humanitarian situation. Fighting usually disrupts the planting season, increases livestock 
movement and reduces access to markets and basic services. It also results in civilian casualties 
and displacement of people from their home areas and lead to increased violations against 
civilians. Furthermore, population movements could also increase the risks of transmission of 
diseases, including polio which re-emerged in Somalia in 2013. 
The near absence of public infrastructure like health, education and other amenities, accounts 
for the deteriorating conditions of the war‐weary population, especially the vulnerable groups like 
women, children and the physically challenged. Farmers have been unable to cultivate their land, 
thereby relying on food aid as the commercial gateways to Mogadishu and Belet Weyne are cut off. 
The costs of basic food products have skyrocketed with an average of 50% due to the blockage of 
the main roads. Water supply is also scarce and the price of 20 litres had tripled, from 1,000 to 
3,000 ($1.2 to $3.6) Somali Shillings with people resorting to drinking unsafe river water as a result 
(OCHA, 2014). 
Somalia’s humanitarian crisis has, therefore, remained one of the largest and most complex in 
the world. Thus, the Somalia Humanitarian Country Team (2014:1) reports that: 
an estimated 2.9 million people are in need of immediate life-saving and livelihood support. 
With roughly 30 percent of the total population in need, humanitarian needs in Somalia are 
significant. One in seven children under the age of five, or 203,000 children, is estimated to be 
acutely malnourished. More than 50,000 of these malnourished children are currently at death’s 
doorstep, and without assistance this number could double in the next six months. Poor and 
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inadequate basic social services continue to undermine the resilience of the people while 635,000 
people in settlements need support to meet basic minimum standards including education, health, 
shelter and WASH. The child and maternal mortality rates for Somalia are among the highest in the 
world; one in every 10 Somali children dies before seeing their first birthday, while one in every 12 
women dies due to pregnancy-related causes. Millions of Somalis remain vulnerable to disease 
outbreaks due to the absence or the weak state of health and WASH services. In some areas one 
in three children suffers from diarrhoea, while polio re-emerged in May 2013. There is no protective 
environment for vulnerable people particularly women and children. 
In spite of the roles of both traditional humanitarian organisations and other stakeholders, the 
existing humanitarian response remains inadequate due to restriction of access and funding-related 
challenges. Considering the outcome of the 2011 and 2012 offensives, intensified military activities 
resulted to increased displacement of people from rural areas towards the urban centres in Baidoa, 
Mogadishu and Kismayo where access to basic services had been hitherto overstretched. Similarly, 
high number of child recruitment, abandonment of previously recruited children, separated and 
unaccompanied children and very high increase in sexual violence are usually associated with such 
situation. Children's access to education is disrupted due to military operation and resulting 
displacement and insecurity. The deprivation of children’s right to education potentially has grave 
effects the longer the offensive lasts. The impact on children also includes physical harm and 
psycho-social trauma. 
As if the foregoing humanitarian challenges occasioned by the campaign of AMISOM-SNAF 
against al-Shabaab insurgency are not enough, donor funding has also been limited. According to 
John Ging, the Director of the Coordination and Response Division of OCHA, as at 20 May 2014, 
the Consolidated Appeal for Somalia which requested US$933 million for 2014, has only been 19% 
funded at US$177 million (UN News Centre, 2014). This limited donor funding has combined with 
AMISOM-SNAF counter-terrorism operations to dim the humanitarian survival of Somali refugees 
and IDPs. The largest components of the humanitarian appeal are food security and nutrition, which 
comprise more than half of the consolidated budget. Other areas of humanitarian assistance that 
have been affected by a lack of contributions include health, water/sanitation/hygiene, protection, 
shelter and education. For example, Ging further reports that on 27 May 2014, the UNICEF which 
provides more than 70% of healthcare needs stated that without new funds it would be forced to 
suspend provision of essential health services to women and children within a month. In a 
corroborative report, the May 2017 OCHA Somalia Humanitarian Bulletin shows that more than 
US$60 million is immediately required to fund emergency needs that have been identified for a 




Essentially, this study investigated the interface between the counter-terrorism operations of 
AMISOM-SNAF and the control of humanitarian crisis in Somalia. It found that the counter-
insurgency of the African Union against al-Shabaab offensives has unduly narrowed access to 
humanitarian assistance in Somalia. In contradistinction to the prevailing threadbare argument that 
effective prosecution of the AMISOM-SNAF counter-terror campaign would herald the prospect of 
humanitarian organisations to have greater access to people in need of humanitarian assistance, 
this paper argued that the successes recorded by the counter-insurgency operation are yet to be 
translated into predictable humanitarian access. Although the post-transitional phase of Somalia 
has witnessed some degree of political stability in terms of launching a new constitution, 
inaugurating a new Federal Parliament, swearing-in of Mr. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President 
of the Federal Republic of Somalia as well as the successful presidential election of 8 February 
2017, these achievements have not been translated into a favourable environment for the delivery 
of humanitarian assistance to the needy population in Mogadishu and its environs. 
Arising from the above, the study recommends that the UNSC, UNSOA and AMISOM should 
expedite action in the transmutation of AMISOM-SNAF into a force that is indigenous to the people 
of Somalia. The Federal Government of Somalia should place greater import on the creation of an 
inclusive, transparent and Somali-owned political system and security architecture that would bring 
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about national integration and cohesion. Ultimately, only the people of Somalia can, in a 
sustainable manner, provide for the security that their people have been yearning for over the past 
decades. Thus, it is only under Somali-owned security architecture that the ever-constricting 
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